In a continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system, the information is conveyed by coherent state carriers. The quantum continuous variables are sent through a quantum channel, where the presence of the eavesdropper adds a white Gaussian noise to the transmission. The amount of tolerable noise and loss is a crucial point in CVQKD, since it determines the overall performance of the protocol, including the secure key rates and transmission distances. In this work, we propose the adaptive multicarrier quadrature division (AMQD) modulation technique for CVQKD. The method granulates the Gaussian random input into Gaussian subcarrier continuous variables in the encoding phase, which are then decoded by a continuous unitary transformation. The subcarrier coherent variables formulate Gaussian sub-channels from the physical link with strongly diverse transmission capabilities, which leads to significantly improved transmission efficiency, higher tolerable loss, and excess noise. We also investigate a modulation-variance adaption technique within the AMQD scheme, which provides optimal capacity-achieving communication over the sub-channels in the presence of a Gaussian noise.
Introduction
Continuous-variable (CV) quantum key distribution (QKD) systems allow for the establishment of an unconditionally secure quantum communication over the current standard telecommunication networks. CVQKD systems possess several benefits and advantages over the DV (discrete variable) protocols, since they do not require specialized devices or unreachable special requirements in an experimental scenario [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . CVQKD systems are based on continuous variables such as Gaussian random position and momentum quadratures in the phase space. The Gaussian modulated coherent states are transmitted over a noisy quantum channel, where the presence of an eavesdropper adds a white Gaussian noise to the transmission. Since CVQKD schemes were developed and introduced just a few years ago, there are still many open questions regarding the optimal encoding scheme. A Gaussian modulation is a robust and easily applicable finding in a practical scenario, and allows for the implementation of the protocol in the experiment; however, CVQKD is still very sensitive to the imperfections of the transmission and the practical devices. The performance of the protocol is strongly determined by the excess noise of the quantum channel, and the transmittance parameter of the physical link (specifically, the Gaussian noise of the quantum channel models the eavesdropper's optimal entangling cloner attack [2] [3] , [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , and the channel is referred to as a Gaussian quantum channel). Since the amount of tolerable loss and the excess noise are central parameters from the viewpoint of the running of CVQKD, it would be very desirable to make some optimization steps in the encoding and decoding process to override the current limitations and to improve the quality of the quantum-level transmission. Our aim is to provide a solution to this problem by introducing the adaptive multicarrier quadrature division (AMQD) modulation technique for CVQKD, which can be applied both in one-way and two-way CVQKD to increase the tolerable loss and excess noise. In traditional telecommunications, OFDM (orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing) is a well-known and widely applied technique for improving the bandwidth efficiency over noisy communication networks [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . In an OFDM scheme, the information is encoded in multiple carrier frequencies, and its main advantage over single-carrier transmission is that the subcarrier-based transmission can attenuate and overwhelm the problems of diverse and unfavorable channel conditions. OFDM systems have been admitted to be a useful encoding method in traditional networking; however, no similar method exists for CVQKD. If a similar solution were available for continuous variables, one could enjoy similar benefits in a quantum-communication scenario; however, up to this point no analogous answer exists for quantum-level transmission. With this in mind, we introduce the idea of AMQD, which works on continuous variables and for which similar benefits can be reached in the process of quantum-level information transmission, e.g., in a classical scenario by the application of the OFDM. In the standard coding scenario, Alice, the sender, modulates and separately transmits each coherent state in the phase space. This standard modulation scheme is referred as singlecarrier modulation throughout, consistent to its traditional meaning.
The key idea behind AMQD modulation is as follows. Alice, draws a zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random vector, which is then transformed by the inverse Fourier operation. At a given modulation variance, Alice prepares her Gaussian subcarrier CVs, which are then fed into the channel. Bob, the receiver, applies the inverse unitary of Alice's operation, which makes it possible for him to recover the noisy version of Alice's input coherent states. This kind of communication will be referred as multicarrier modulation.
What are the main advantages of this kind of communication? There are several fine corollaries. First of all, the Gaussian subcarrier CV states sent through the channel, which overall allows higher tolerable loss and excess noise at a given modulation variance. Second, the Gaussian quantum channel can be viewed as several parallel Gaussian quantum channels, called sub-channels, each dedicated for the transmission of a given subcarrier with an independent, and significantly lower noise variance. Third, the information transmission capability of the sub-channels is very diverse, depending on the variance of the subcarrier CV, which allows for the development of smart adaptive modulation techniques for the proposed multicarrier quadrature division-encoding technique. The idea behind this is to use only the "good" Gaussian sub-channels for the transmission, and to not send any valuable information over the so noisy sub-channels. It is a particularly convenient approach, since the result of the adaptive allocation is a better performance of the protocol at low SNRs (signal-to-noise ratio) and higher tolerable loss, which are crucial cornerstones in an experimental CVQKD that operates in practice at very low SNRs. From these, the purposes are now clear. We have to find the operation that works on continuous variables and outputs the subcarrier quadratures, which can divide the physical Gaussian channel into Gaussian sub-channels. We also need the continuous unitary inverse of this operation. If we have it, then we have to find an adaptive modulation-variance allocation mechanism, which allows no to send valuable information over the very noisy Gaussian sub-channels. Fortunately, these features are all included in our AMQD coding scheme. The AMQD modulation granulates Alice's initial Gaussian states into several subcarrier Gaussian CVs, which divide the physical channel into several Gaussian sub-channels. Bob applies an inverse continuous unitary operation, which allows him to obtain Alice's initial (noisy) coherent states. The proposed AMQD modulation offers several important features, but the main improvement is in the quality of the quantum-level transmission, since the subcarriers allow a more efficient communication over the same quantum channel at a given modulation variance.
The AMQD framework allows us to define multiple-access multicarrier CVQKD [22] , to prove the improved secret key rates and security thresholds of multicarrier CVQKD [24] , and due to the fact that the multicarrier modulation injects several extra degrees of freedom into the transmission, it makes possible to introduce advanced phenomena that are not available in a single-carrier CVQKD setting such as singular layer transmission [23] , multidimensional manifold extraction [25] , utilization of the sub-carrier domain [26] , and advanced quadrature detection with subchannel estimation [27] [28] [29] .
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, preliminaries are proposed. Section 3 introduces the multicarrier quadrature division scheme. In Section 4, the adaptive modulation variance allocation mechanism is discussed. Section 5 studies the performance of AMQD modulation. Section 6 provides the security proof of AMQD against optimal Gaussian collective attacks. Finally, Section 7 concludes the results.
Preliminaries
In the standard single-carrier modulation scheme, the input coherent state i i i
Gaussian state in the phase space  , with i.i.d. Gaussian random position and momentum quadratures ( ) 
In the single-carrier scenario, the transmission of this complex variable over the Gaussian quantum channel  can be characterized by the ( )
where ( )
stands for the transmission of the position quadrature,
by our convention. The ( )
and the squared magnitude of ( )
. Assuming a 0 dB loss, the quadrature transmittance is parameterized
At a given input x, the channel output y can be expressed as
, models the Gaussian noise of the quantum channel (also a zero-mean, symmetric circular complex Gaussian random variable), with independent quadrature components ( )
This Gaussian quantum channel is equipped with a capacity of ( ) ( )
where 0 2 w s is the modulation variance (single-carrier) of the input Gaussian signal.
In the multicarrier case, the Gaussian quantum channel is divided into n Gaussian sub-channels ,
each with an independent noise variance 2 i s  , each for the transmission of a continuous variable subcarrier , i f which leads to the output for the i-th sub-channel:
, and the resulting transmission capacity is At this point, the capacity formulas of (7) and (9) require some clarification. Assuming a Gaussian quantum channel, one can find two different capacity formulas for the real dimension and the complex dimension. The reason is as follows. The noise is independent on the real and imaginary parts (i.e., on the position and momentum quadratures), and each use of the complex Gaussian channel is in particular analogous to two uses of the real Gaussian channel. From this distinction, two different types of capacity formulas can be derived for the same Gaussian channel, i.e., the real-dimension capacity and the complex-dimension capacity. The real dimension capacity of an AWGN is ( ) ( )
while the complex dimension capacity is precisely
In (11) the use of the complex domain is justified by the fact that circular symmetric complex Gaussian random variables will be transmitted through the Gaussian quantum channel. The SNR of the channel is ( )
For the precise clarification, we will use the complex-domain capacity formula throughout, since the coherent state in the phase space is a complex variable. (Note: For the achievable secret key rates of AMQD at a heterodyne and homodyne measurement setting see [24] . For an adaptive quadrature detection mechanism (homodyne and heterodyne) developed for AMQD, see [27] ).
Multicarrier Quadrature Division Modulation

Continuous-Variable Quantum Fourier Transform
In terms of the CV scenario, by a convention the x position quadrature could be used as a computational basis. We will also do this throughout. (The continuous-variable quantum Fourier transformation will be abbreviated as CVQFT.) Let the Gaussian variable be ( )
The Fourier transform of (13) is expressed as
Between the Fourier transform ( ) F x and the inverse Fourier transform function
connection is as follows [7] [8] :
where ( ) ( )
For an n-dimensional Gaussian random vector
is the covariance matrix, the Fourier transform and its inverse:
K is a n-dimensional Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix Proof. First, we propose the CVQFT operation acting on the continuous variables, and then we rewrite it as a zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random variable.
Assuming x position computational basis, function ( ) F ⋅ acts on the coherent input i j as follows [1] :
and
are wavefunctions in the position space x, and momentum space p for the state i j , respectively.
The notation x y stands for the inner product [1] , which can be rewritten as
where ( ) 
where
. c p u pu p q c p u p q dp f p p c p dp
The inverse function of (19) is defined as ( )
while the 
The i-th subcarrier CV is defined as
where IFFT stands for the Inverse Fast Fourier Transform, and subcarrier continuous variable i f in (31) is also a zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random variable 
where CVQFT is the continuous-variable QFT operation.
Let us to derive the Fourier transform of the Gaussian input [7] [8] . First, we rewrite (28) in the position basis x as ( ) 
The characterization of the Gaussian sub-channels is proposed Theorem 1.
Proof.
Let n is the number of Alice's input Gaussian states. The n input coherent states are modeled by an n-dimensional, zero-mean, circular symmetric complex random Gaussian vector
where each i z can be modeled as a zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random variable ( )
The real and imaginary variables (i.e., the position and momentum quadratures) formulate ndimensional real Gaussian random vectors,
zero-mean Gaussian random variables ( ) 
where 0 2 w s is the stands for single-carrier modulation variance (precisely, the variance of the real and imaginary components of i z ), while z K is the n ń Hermitian covariance matrix of z :
where † z is the adjoint of z . For vector z ,
holds, and ( )
for any
A n-dimensional Gaussian random vector is expressed as = x As, where A is an (invertible) linear transform from n  to n  , and s is an n-dimensional standard Gaussian random vector
. This vector is characterized by its covariance matrix ( )
The Fourier transformation
In the first step of AMQD, Alice applies the inverse FFT operation to vector z (see (34)), which results in an n-dimensional zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random vector d , 
In the next step, Alice modulates the coherent Gaussian subcarriers as follows:
( )
The result of (42) defines n, independent i  Gaussian sub-channels, each with noise variance 2 i s  , one for each subcarrier coherent state i f . After the CV subcarriers are transmitted through the noisy channel, Bob applies the CVQFT, which results him the noisy version
On Bob's side, the received system y is an n-dimensional zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random vector
The m-th element of vector y is m y , expressed as follows:
is a complex variable, which quantifies the position and momentum quadrature transmission (i.e., gain) of the i-th Gaussian sub-channel i  , in the phase space  , with real and imaginary parts
Re Im
The CVQFT-transformed channel transmission parameters are (upscaled by n ) expressed by the complex vector:
which is the Fourier transform of the n-dimensional zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaus-
, , 0,
which identifies the Gaussian noise of the i-th sub-channel i  on the quadrature components in the phase space  .
The CVQFT-transformed noise vector in (49) can be rewritten as
with independent components ( )
It also defines an n-dimensional zero-mean, circular symmetric complex
and the noise variance
s  on the quadrature components (For simplicity, the notation of n ń I will be omitted from the description.). An AMQD block is formulated from n Gaussian subcarrier continuous variables, as follows:
where j is the index of the AMQD block,
The squared magnitude
identifies an exponentially distributed variable, with density ( ) ( ) the Parseval theorem [6] it follows that
while the average quadrature modulation variance is The transformed vector y in (45) and (55) clearly demonstrates that the physical Gaussian channel is, in fact, divided into n Gaussian quantum channels with independent noise variances. Each i  Gaussian sub-channel is dedicated for the transmission of one Gaussian subcarrier CV from the n subcarrier CVs. ■
Gaussian Noise of the Sub-channels
Eve's optimal entangling cloner attack [2] in the multicarrier modulation setting is described as follows. Let the quadratures of the i-th 
The part i B of is sent back to i  , which system has the following quadratures:
The simplified view of Eve's Gaussian attack in the multicarrier scenario is summarized in Fig. 2 .
Eve attacks each sub-channel with a BS with transmittance In the AMQD scenario, the appropriate noise vector is given by (49) and (52), as
For the security proof of AMQD against optimal Gaussian collective attacks is being presented in Theorem 4.
Crosstalk Noise on the Sub-channels
The crosstalk is an additive noise in multicarrier transmission that can occur between adjacent sub-channels. Crosstalk noise can result from a nonperfect sub-channel separation and subchannel filtering procedure. As a result of interchannel crosstalk, some information from neighboring channels can leak, which acts as noise to the receiver. In practice, crosstalk arises from the imperfections of optical filters, optical switches or other optical components, e.g., from the imperfect isolation of different wavelength ports [19] . The effect of interchannel crosstalk in an AMQD modulation is depicted in Fig. 3 . Crosstalk noise has no effect on the security of AMQD modulation, since it allows no more leaking of information to an eavesdropper than single-carrier CVQKD protocols (see Theorem 4) . Figure 3 . The effect of crosstalk noise between sub-channels. Due to the imperfections of practical devices, some information from neighboring sub-channels can be leaked to a given subchannel, which acts as noise to the receiver.
As it is depicted in Fig. 3 , for sub-channel 2, some crosstalk information brings up from neighboring sub-channels, 1 and 3. Any nonzero crosstalk information can leak information of only negligible valuable to Eve, as is proven in Theorem 4.
The crosstalk information ( )
is evaluated from the interference noise of the neighboring sub-channels as follows:
is the Holevo information of Alice and Bob conveyed by the neighboring sub-channel , j  for all j i ¹ . The average crosstalk on the n sub-channels is expressed as
Since the crosstalk noise
 acts for Bob as Gaussian noise (which is justified by the Central Limit Theorem, more precisely for i  ¥ ), it can be modeled by
. This additional noise does not change the rate formulas of AMQD (see (74) and (80)), because this additional noise is already contained in the sub-channel's noise variance 2 i s  .
In other words, the mutual information between Alice and Bob is completely characterized for a given i  by the noise variance 2 i s  , which can be decomposed as 
where 2 , Eve i s is the noise variance of Eve's optimal Gaussian collective attack.
Assuming that l sub-channels have been allocated for the multicarrier transmission, the mutual information function of Alice and Bob remains untouched under the presence of nonzero crosstalk, i.e., (
:
. However, the ( )
Holevo information of Eve, in the presence of a nonzero crosstalk between the sub-channels changes as follows:
: to the n sub-channel (a nonzero crosstalk can also occur on an unused sub-channel, hence all subchannels have to be taken into consideration in the RHS of (65)). For detailed security proof of AMQD against optimal Gaussian collective attacks, see Theorem 4.
Run of Multicarrier Quadrature Division
The run of the multicarrier quadrature division is sketched as follows. In the initial phase, Alice draws an n-dimensional, zero-mean circular symmetric complex Gaussian random vector (Note: In the two-way protocol, Bob sends the subcarrier CVs to Alice, who generates coupled Gaussian CVs with her BS. The resulting Gaussian subcarrier CV is then sent back to Bob, who applies the CVQFT operation. Alice also applies a CVQFT operation on her system.) The reason behind the improvement is that the dB limits of the transmission over the Gaussian quantum channel can significantly be extended by the Fourier-transformed multicarrier continuous variables. The adaptive modulation sends information through only the high-quality sub-channels, while the noisy sub-channels transmit no information, as it is proposed in the next section.
Adaptive Modulation Variance
Theorem 2. (Adaptive modulation variance.) The ratio ( ) ( )
optimal constant modulation variance for the Gaussian sub-channels, where Eve n is a security bound of the optimal Gaussian collective attack.
Proof.
Note the proof throughout the section focuses on the transmission of classical information. The rigorous derivation of the private classical capacity and the achievable secret key rates of AMQD are included in [24] . The proof consists of two parts. First, we show that there exists an optimal constant modulation variance for the sub-channels with average ( ) is the squared magnitude of the sum of the Fourier coefficients of the n Gaussian sub-channels. Then, we show that for low SNRs, the optimal solution is ( )
The modulation variances of each of the i  sub-channels (zero or nonzero) are dependent on the value of Eve n . This parameter is defined as
where l is the Lagrange multiplier as ( ) 
where * T  is the expected transmittance of the n sub-channels under an optimal Gaussian attack. 
By the Kuhn-Tucker condition [6] , [9] [10] After some calculations, one gets the following average modulation variance:
where n is shown in (66). One can readily see that in (70), each sub-channel is allocated by a different modulation variance, depending on the actual value of ( ) ( ) 
It is particular convenient, since at a given Eve n bound, it is enough to find a given ( ) ( )
hold (Note: It can be determined in a pre-calibration phase prior to the main run of the protocol. In practice, this phase can be established in one simple step by sending empty "pilot" continuous variables over the sub-channels that contain no valuable information.), and then allocating the same modulation variance 2 w s for all of these sub-channels.
Particularly, the significance of the adaptive-variance modulation proposed in (71) is crucial for low SNRs, which is precisely the case in a long-distance scenario, since the information transmission capability of the Gaussian sub-channels become very sensitive in the low SNR regimes [4] , [6] , [9] [10] . At low SNRs the constant allocation provides an optimal solution [9] [10] , because its performance is very close to the exact allocation and can be performed with no exact knowledge about the state of the sub-channels. This is very good news, because the proposed AMQD modulation scheme allocates a constant modulation variance for the good Gaussian sub-channels.
The algorithm of the optimal constant [9-10] modulation variance adaption is summarized as follows.
Algorithm
1.
Let the squared magnitudes of the Fourier-transformed sub-channel transmittance coefficients given in an ordered list
, and let l be the Lagrange coefficient and 1
Let c be the largest index in the list, denoted by ( ) 
Determine the constant modulation variance
The modulation variance adaption scheme is summarized in Fig. 5 . The parameter i n of the Gaussian sub-channels is depicted in yellow. If i n is under a critical limit Eve n , the channel is assumed to be useful and can be used for information transmission. The AMQD is equipped with all of those properties that allow it to meet the requirements of an experimental protocol, since its real potential is brought to life at very low SNRs. As a fine corollary, the transmission efficiency significantly can be boosted in an experimental long-distance CVQKD scenario.
The adaptive modulation variance can be rephrased in terms of the normalized ( ) 
In Fig. 6 , the adaptive modulation variance technique in terms of the normalized quantity [6] ( ) 
which shows that better rates can be reached by the AMQD modulation at a given noise variance 
Pr max
From this, the achievable rate is
It can be concluded that the adaptive modulation variance increases the performance, especially in low SNR regimes, in which situation a constant modulation variance for all sub-channels is optimal. It also optimizes the received modulation variance at the decoder. Finally, in terms of (72) the rate is evaluated as Proof.
The efficiency of the adaptive multicarrier division technique can be approached by how efficiently the allocated modulation variances are utilized at a given secret key rate. Assuming a single-carrier quadrature encoding-scheme with efficiency
where 2 b = is the number of quadrature bases (position and momentum bases), R is the secret key rate, and 0 2 w s is the modulation variance used for the modulation of n coherent states. In the adaptive multicarrier division technique, the rate R given in (81) can be reached with efficiency:
where 2 w s is the constant modulation variance is used for the l subcarriers. If The improvement in the tolerable loss is as follows. In the single-carrier modulation scheme, at the 3.1 dB of signal attenuation the quantum channel makes no possible to transmit any information. In the multicarrier modulation, the tolerable loss is more than 3.1 dB at the same modulation variance 
where 0 0 2 2 w w s s A > , and 1 A > , which is evaluated as
The FWHMs of these Gaussian signals are as follows:
and ( ) ( )
These results are summarized in Fig. 7 . The improvement in the excess noise is as follows [3] . In the single-carrier case, at a given Eve T and W, the excess noise is as [3] : 
The , tol AMQD N tolerable excess noise in AMQD modulation with homodyne measurement [3] is depicted in Fig. 8 . The improvement in the tolerable excess noise is The improvement in the amount of tolerable excess noise is more significant in two-way CVQKD, since the multicarrier transmission is present in both directions between Alice to Bob. ■
Secret Key Rates of AMQD
To express the S secret key rates of AMQD, let l Gaussian sub-channels with i E v e n n < , and let the variance of Eve's EPR-ancilla W [2] [3] . For a detailed proof on the achievable secret key rates and security thresholds of AMQD, see [24] . 
AMQD Modulation in One-way CVQKD
S + + - - - - = - - å  (95) where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 2 1 1 1 i i i i l l l l b FT W FT = - + å å   .(96+ + - - å = å ae ö ÷ ç + - ÷ ç ÷ ç è ø - -   ,(97)
Security of AMQD for Optimal Gaussian Attacks
The main result regarding the security of AMQD is summarized in Theorem 4. It states that under an optimal Gaussian collective attack, any crosstalk among the sub-channels cannot allow leaking of more information to an eavesdropper than the single-carrier CVQKD. 
In the next step, we express the Holevo information of the eavesdropper ( ) , Assuming an average modulation variance 
. follows for an AMQD modulation. The first equality follows from the fact that the presence of any nonzero crosstalk does not change on the mutual information of the legally parties, while the second comes from that in an AMQD modulation the same amount of information transmitted than single-carrier CVQKD via lower modulation variance (see (75)), from which (108) is immediately concluded. Finally, we show that the Gaussian collective attack is optimal in the AMQD modulation. Fixing the first and second moments, under an optimal Gaussian attack for all sub-channels i  , 1 i n =  , and with a nonzero crosstalk ( ) 0
, by the optimality consumption one obtains nonnegative 0 D ³ for the difference of Eve's Holevo information that results from an optimal Gaussian and an arbitrary attack:
: :
is Eve's average Holevo information in an AMQD modulation for an arbitrary attack, ( )
is evaluated by (105) g¢   refer to the leaked valuable crosstalk information under an optimal Gaussian and an arbitrary attack, respectively.
Since any nonzero crosstalk ( ) 0
acts as a Gaussian noise for the receiver that is already included in the sub-channel noise variance 2 i s  , see (64), the next equation is straightforward for the minimized mutual information under an optimal Gaussian collective attack:
Thus, Eve's Gaussian collective attack remains optimal in an AMQD modulation (i.e., Eve's Holevo information is maximized), and the presence of a nonzero crosstalk has no effect on the mutual information between Alice and Bob. On the other hand, Eve's Holevo information could be slightly improved by a nonzero crosstalk, to be precise by ( ) :
which reveals that in an AMQD modulation, the degradation of Eve's Holevo information in comparison to the single-carrier CVQKD is always equal to or greater than the valuable information that is leaked from the crosstalk to Eve, thus ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 :
hence for any ( ) :
and, if Bob is allowed to perform a collective measurement, then the secret key rate is ( ) ( ) : :
For the rigorous proofs of the achievable secret key rates of AMQD at a homodyne and heterodyne measurement, see the derivations of [24] . For an adaptive quadrature measurement scheme for multicarrier CVQKD, see [27] . These results prove the unconditional security of AMQD against optimal Gaussian collective attacks, which concludes the proof. ■
Conclusions
The CVQKD protocols represent one of the most capable practical manifestations of quantum information theory. While the DVQKD protocols cannot be implemented within the framework of current technology, the CVQKD schemes can be established over standard communication networks and practical devices. Besides the attractive properties, the CVQKD schemes have an extreme sensitivity to the channel noise and other loss which allow no to use these protocols with such a high efficiency as it is available for traditional protocols in a traditional telecommunication scenario. To resolve the problem of low tolerable loss and excess noise, we introduced a new modulation scheme for CVQKD. The input Gaussian variables are transformed into several Gaussian subcarrier CVs, which are then transformed back by the continuous unitary CVQFT operation at the receiver. The transmission is realized through several Gaussian sub-channels, each dedicated to a given subcarrier with an independent noise variance. The AMQD modulation allows higher tolerable loss and excess noise in comparison with the standard modulation, and can be applied in both one-way and two-way CVQKD. We also investigated an adaptive modulation variance allocation mechanism for the scheme, which can significantly improve the efficiency of the transmission, particularly in the low SNR regimes. The CVQFT transform of transmittance matrix ( ) n Î T   , n dimensional complex vector. R Transmission rate of classical information. S
Secret key rate.
S.2 Abbreviations
AMQD Adaptive Multicarrier Quadrature Division AWGN
Additive White Gaussian Noise BS Beam Splitter
